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Introduction
Recent conversations with some native artisans who have been
at the Rand since the war elicited certain facts which may be
calculated to render all attempts at learning any kind of
X^rofession altogether futile. Coloured mechanics can get no
employment in Johannesburg--the greatest centre of all sorts of
industry at the present time. It appears that the white
professional tradesman treat all kinds of professions as a monopoly
and master builders and contractors are subject to the dictatorship
of "rings" formed by the labouring classes who are determined to
preclude all persons of colour, of whatever capabilities, from
partaking in occupations that make it worth their while to be on
the Rand ...
We are not aware to what extent the government of the country
is responsible for allowing this state of things to exist. But if
one section of the community is to suffer hardships through the
uncompromising attitude which the white tradesmen have assumed
toward the black, and the government remain passive or incapable of
doing anything, there is no knowing to what eventualities this may
lead. In America, where the inhabitants are of a diversity of
colour as out here, things cannot be said to be in a satisfactory
condition, and in some quarters, there are sad forebodings of the
future of the States. Colour-line prejudice is greatly responsible
for what has and what may happen. To differentiate the conduct of
industrial persuits (sic) on colour lines is the worst thing to do
and no better factor, to eliminate mutual sympathy and mutual
confidence from among the races, can possibly be devised... The
position of the of the Rand at the present time with regard to
natives and professions leads one to think that in the near future
it shall become necessary for the black races to act independently,
which will mean competition against if not opposition to white
interests. We shall then experience the same condition as in the
States.
excerpt from an editorial in Ipepa lo Hlanga, 26 February 1904
The money that will be required here [in South Africa] is
startling in its amounts, and with the apathy which the world
has been led to feel toward us, I cannot but feel that
organized capital will have great opportunites...
W.L. Honnold to Robert Goering, 25 July 1904
Many of the questions that underscore my present research grew
out of the final chapters of my book on the first two generations
of African mineworkers at the Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga( A
Working Class in the Making:Belgian Colonial Labor Policy, Private
Enterprise and the African Mineworker, 1907-1951, Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1989). In those closing chapters I
maintained that once the Union Miniere became the chief supplier of
strategic raw materials for the United States and Great Britain,
including cobalt and uranium for jet airplanes and atomic bombs,
during the Second World War, the old forms of state power became
woefully inadequate. The external and internal economic and
political demands of the war pushed Belgian colonial rule in
Katanga to the brink of collapse. Consequently, much of the
explosiveness of the inter- and post- war periods derived more from
the repressive nature of the colonial state than the growth of the
industrial workforce per se. Yet the grievances of the African
mineworkers and other African workers quickened protest from other
quarters of society—to the point that many local European
administrators thought that colonial rule would be swept away by
one solitary wave of popular protest.
The present crisis in southern Africa, particularly in South
Africa, shares many common features with the Congo crisis.
Moreover, the acute economic rivalry among the western powers and
Japan, which has been advanced by low rates of profit and economic
growth, global unemployment, balance of payment difficulties, and
the attempt to monopolize technical innovations in microprocessing
and genetic engineering, has enhanced the destructive potential of
the crisis in southern Africa. Whether this situation can be
likened to an instance of what the economist Joseph Schumpeter
called "creative destruction" remains to be seen. But like many
authoritarian societies that have been compelled to change in the
face of widespread popular protest, questions about who shall
acquire the lion's share of political power appear to have
prevailed over those that ask the meaning of justice and popular
sovereignty.
The stalled nature of southern Africa's industrial revolution,
combined with the economic difficulties and political devolution of
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, has led to a protracted
restructring of interstate relations within southern Africa—so
much so, that heretofore implacacble enemies in Angola, Mozambique,
South Africa and elsewhere feel compelled to engage in urgent and
frank discussions about the region's future. But how do the
hundreds of thousands of rural families scarred by war,
agricultural involution, and famine fit into these discussions?
What, of the industrial workers who face an uncertain future as a
result of flucuating business activity and the efforts of various
states in the region, most notably South Africa, to impede popular-
intervention at the workplace and in the establishment of
democratic forms of government?
The degree to which the regional character of southern Africa
becomes a sanguine feature of economic and political life very much
depends on the character of the new relationships being forged by
internal and external corporate interests, the extant nation-
states , and the nature of the intervention that southern Africa's
rural and urban population will make in the new discourse on
political participation and economic well-being. These
developments may in fact become the catalyst for renewed demands
for an immediate increase in the living standards of the African
majority, touching off a crisis not unlike those of Poland and
Eastern Europe. The central paradox of the present and long term
situation is that no one's interests will be served if southern
Africa finds itself on the margins of the new pattern of global
economic and political transformation.
Underscoring the striking array of social inequality in
southern Africa is the fact that nearly all the states of Africa
that have achieved independence in the past generation are plagued
by stagnant agricultural development. The difficulties with
agriculture are all the more acute in southern Africa because of
the widespread nature of industrial activity. Recent statistics
suggest that shortfalls in agriculture in southern Africa are in
fact worsening. The roots of the problem lie not only in the
present situation but also deep in the colonial past.
The Problem
The problem before you seems to me to be one of
national economics, and not one merely of class
grievance. Every rapidly advancing country has had
frequently, to remodel its fiscal system and
administrative laws, not only to meet the requirements
of its growing Government, but to satisfy the
strenuous demands and imperative necessities of its
expanding or languishing industries. The present
case in the South African Republic is not exceptional
in the mere fact of clamorous demand for reform and
abolition of industrial burdens. It is singular only
in the form in which it has appeared, and in the fact
that it has become so acute as to cut its way into
international politics.
William Hall, American civil engineer, giving
testimony before the 1897 Industrial Commission of
Inquiry of the Transvaal Republic
Following the Great Slump or Panic of 1873 the industrial
elites in all the western countries were in a position not unlike
that of the European aristocracy in 1815: outwardly stable and in
complete moral and ideological control of their respective
societies, inwardly divided and unsure of their own moral
convictions and social ideals. Some of them clung to the old
beliefs in Free Trade and supply and demand, while rejecting state
intervention in the economy. Others believed that the could only
protect themselves fron the catastrophic fall in prices with
protective tariffs, assured markets, and a gold standard for the
currencies of the industrial nations, even though those
entrepreneurs and statesmen who plumped for these measures were not
in complete agreement about how they were to be implemented. Mone
of them, however, wanted to pay the price of their convictions--
they wanted privilege without obligation, power without
responsibility.
Consequently, as early as the 1870s, the industrial nations
plunged into a series of foreign wars which sought to redivide the
spoils of the global economy in accordance with the new, more
Eurocentric relations of power. These wars of colonail conquest
further enhanced the gap in the standard of living between the
industrial and agrarian countries-- a gap which achieved
frightening proportions in the years between 1873 and 1895. Much
of the carnage associated with the colonial wars was a result of
the disparity between their objectives and the means of prosecuting
them, for these were nineteenth century wars fought with twentieth
century means. The South African War of 1899-1902 was, in fact,
such a conflict., bringing in its train a pall of devastation that
spread over agrarian communities from the Cape of Good Hope to the
Zambezi River. The avatars of industrialization--drilling rigs,
machine tools, rail lines, strong drink, and humbled expectations--
followed swiftly behind the cassons and howitzers.
However, well after the war, making' the colonies of southern
Africa pay for themselves by selectively industrializing their
infrastructure in order to facilitate better the extraction of
agricultural products and raw materials remained problematic.
One can best, sum up the importance of this problem by contrasting
it. with what came immediately before. Of that previous time one
historian has said: "Trade by itself made no difference to the map
of Africa or Asia. It was only when this trade was backed up by an
investment in law and oreder that it led to territorial changes."
In short the qujntessential expression of the advantage possessed
by the industrial nations was their ability to produce and exploit
devastating weapons of mass destruction.
For example, in southern Africa in particular, all the
colonial powers claimed, in one way or another, that they had come
to Africa t-.o save the Africans from themselves--to build a dike
against the swirling waters of nihilism, anarchy, and disease; to
become in fact a servant of the future interests of the African
people. Thi s entailed compel ling the Africans to labor without
concern for their immediate benefit or remuneration, but with the
assurance that the colonial masters would eventually bestow the
fruits of their unrequited labor on future generations of Africans.
But how many Sotho or Tswana peasants, much less British working-
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class conscripts steaming toward South Africa in the winter of
1899, believed this formula to be an apt expression of their
sentiments?
European plans for southern Africa were often as ambiguous as
they were colossal. Cecil Rhodes's Cape to Cairo railroad scheme
and the German massacre of the Here.ro and Nama bore powerful
witness to the monstrous nature that these plans could assume. But
how they were to be realized remained an area of darkness until the
close of the First World War. In this early epoch of dimness the
groping of the colonial powers led to a vast and senseless loss of
African life, and to a belief on the part of European employers and
the state that they could outfit industry and agriculture with the
requisite amount of cheap African labor within the confines of a
purely microeconomic framework. Put crudely, the problem was how
to exploit the African as peasant farmer and wage laborer; govern
him largely without his consent; and simultaneously accord him a
measure of humanity that would make his exploitation and lack of
political participation appear tolerable. Any solution to this
conundrum would have seemed like a conjurer's trick.
Despite the weapons of mass destruction and the ideological
overlay, these objectives were simply impossible. What the
employers and colonial officials had not sufficiently understood
was that even a much qualified version of industrialization was
going to change not only those Africans who came to live in the
cities but also those who remained on the land. Once the colonial
enclosure of land commenced, the catalysts for this transformation
came in the persons of missionaries, tax collectors, and labor
recruiters. And once industry and commerical agriculture became
focal points of economic exploitation African colonial subjects
quickly grasped the lessons that had eluded their former political
leaders. In fact, we need to know more about how the battle lines
between ru]ers and ruled were redrawn in this crucial period, in
order to understand better how ordinary people in Africa came to
terms with colonial rule.
Consequently, I also start with several deceptively simple
questions: What kind of society did white men of power and
influence construct in southern Africa and, parenthetically, in the
United States at the close of the nineteenth century and at the
outset of the twentieth century, by means of other people's labor
and a ruthless and uncompromising drive to accumulate wealth--by
what the German political scientist Jurgen Habermas might call
"rational sublimation"? More importantly, how did thi s process of
accumulation and domination produce a rage so intense at all levels
of these two societies during this period that the means of
accumulating wealth could and did , on occasion, grate sharply
against the rather modest expectations of people who were neither
powerful nor white nor male in many instances? Finally, how did
this rage and the unmet expectations, of those people who did not
possess great wealth or direct access to state power occasionally
coalesce to produce startling and ominous instances of popular
protest.
To be sure, this protest was not virulent or sustained enough
to undo the rule of the men who were called the Randlords in South
Africa and the robber barons in the United States; but on occasion,
in the wake of popular discontent over taxes, freight rates, and
wages, men such as Cecil Rhodes, Julius Werhner, Lionel Phillips,
and J.P. Morgan were compelled to examine the precise nature and
extent of their power. Under the impress of popular agitation and
protest such men were also obliged to make disturbing associations,
at least from their perspective, between economic growth and
democratic ideals. This pairing of ideals and economic objectives,
however disconcerting it may have been, became characteristic of
American bankers, engineers and statesmen who envisioned a
determining role for the United States in southern Africa at the
turn of the century; for they believed that the gold mines of the
Rand presented a unique opportunity to test the strengths of the
new American business culture. All of their activities in southern
Africa were informed by a single question: was the new and uniquely
American form of business organization, the corporation, a
democratic means of orchestrating the participation of various
classes and races in orderly economic progress or was it merely a
shill for high level instances of piracy?
After 1907 the American corporation, then, became the
institutional center of a new kind of business culture in both the
United States and South Africa. It would find its most
illuminating expressions in South Africa in the opening up of the
deep level mines of the Far East Rand on the one hand and the
transformation of the legal context of land ownership in the
Transvaal and Natal Provinces on the other. The transformation in
both spheres of economic activity had far reaching consequences for
the kind of civil society that emerged in South Africa at this
point, inasmuch as both served to rupture the customary
relationship between property ownership and the political franchise
that ussually obtains in industrializing capitalist societies.
However, the triumph of the corporate form of business organization
in South Africa raises as many questions as it answers. Consider
the observations of Peter Richardson and Jean-Jacques van Helton*
This review of the long-term accumulation strategies
of the various groups between 1902 and 1918 suggests that
current research has obscured some important behavioural
and structural changes in the Witwatersrand mining industry.
.., by ignoring the importance of the Far East Rand in this
period, it has made unintelligible the veritable revolution
in the balance of power among amongst the groups which became
evident during the First World War. The sharply augmented
power of JCI(Johannesburg Consolidated Investment
Corporation), A. Goerz and Company, and CMS(Consolidated Mines
Selection Corporation) at the expense of the more conservative
groups derived largely from the Far East Rand and suggests
that the causes of this process deserve greater attention than
they have so far received from historians.
But the competition for means of production and the consequent
shift to deep level mining began as early as 1902, some five or six
years before the conditional triumph of the corporation in South
Africa. Moreover, deep level mining did not immediately replace
outcrop mining. For example, the absorption of Werhner, Beit and
Company into the London based investment group, the Central Mining
Trustj was a powerful attempt to shore up the productive base of
mining operations on the Central Rand, while establishing new
financial criteria for large-scale participation in the mining
industry in general. To be sure, Sir Julius Werhner's efforts in
this area may have been prompted by a fera that the value of the
properties he was associated with would soon plunge to basement
bargain levels with the onset of the depression of 1906-08. But
these efforts also demonstrated the growing appreciation that the
previous generation of Randlords had for the closer relationship
between problems of labor and technology in the mining industry
immediately after the war. One need only take a casual glance at
the monthly reports of the Chamber of Mines in the immediate
postwar period to get a sense of the breadth of their appreciation.
However, in all its various forms, the investment group was a
transitory and transitional form of business organization. It
arose in direct response to the economic crises of the early 1890s
and passed out of existence at the end of the abovementioned
depression. Moreover, despite Robert Vicat Turrell and Jean-
Jacques van Helten's trenchant observations of S. D. Chapman's
conception of the investment group, Chapman and others have rightly
obsei-ved that the investment group was a uniquely British response
to crises and opportunity at the turn of the century.
Consequently, given the dramatic decline of British manufacture
against that of Germany and the United States in this same time
period, it was also a uniquely passive response, which, of course,
became more or less ineffectual at the close of the twentieth
century' s first, decade.
Hnnce the origins of the present long-term secular crises in
the United States and South Africa are in part rooted in how each
of these countries negotiated the circumstances of the period
between the Depression of 1906-08 and the failure of the industrial
countries to institute a unilateral policy of price and monetary
stabilization after the First World War and the corosive global
recession of 1921-22. In the wake of these circumstances farmers
of all kinds in both countries were compelled to recognize that the
business cycle and the modern state had an even greater effect on
them than the passing of the seasons, and that they had little or
no chance of succeeding in a test of wills between themselves and
these institutions. Workers in fields, factories and mines were
subjected to rules of work governed not only by wages and hours but
by the ghoulish intervention of more and more machinery—machinery
that had been called into existence by the efforts of previous
generations of living labor{machine tools and the assembly line in
the United States, and mining stamps and drills in South Africa,
for example ). And entrepeneurs and politicians, while sometimes
willing to play a fast and loose game of "give and take" on the
question of living standards, even in these two multiethnic and
multiracial societies, were absolutely intransigent on the question
of broadening the popular base for formal entitlements and
political participation.
Corporate culture in the American and South African settings
has tended to place a great deal of emphasis on withholding any
participation in setting production procedures and the cultural
context of production from unions or their functional equivalent.
Well before the depression of 1906-08 and the triumph of what I
have provisionally called the "corporate model", Cecil Rhodes
minuted, "The natives are in a sense citizens, but not altogether
citizens. And though we place them in individual position with
regard to certain pieces of agricultural land, we protect them by
all sorts of laws..." Rhodes could have closed by saying, "... in
much the same way as we do for natural resources." In short, even
with the ownership of land, Africans did not assume enough risk to
be thought of as citizens, or to participate in the iundamental
debates of the public sphere of civil society. Indeed, their
future condition formed one of these fundamental debates.
And how did Rhodes and the subsequent generation of Randlords
interpret "risk"? One can reasonably assume that their defintion
of risk derived from their experiences in the mining industry.
Hence risk was associate with being a large employer of wage labor.
And once professional engineers began to supplant their more
swashbuckling predecessors the notion of risk-- in defiance of the
degree of uncertainty that is inherent in the very defintion of
the term-- came to be invested with a scientific aura. Even though
the letter way of thinking was implicit, it was deeply inscribed in
the thinking of the men in question. Conversely, risk for a
peasant farmer amounted to gambling with his household's margin of
subsistence to improve his position with respect to the commercial
market for whatever he produced.
The intransigence of the two sets of entrepreneurs in question
was a result of more than bourgeois cultural mores and personal
tastes, although one should not readily discount such factors in
the process of reconstructing the idiom in which these men thought
and made decisions. Coming out of the generation of slump ana
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depression, from 1873 to 1894, entrepreneurs on both sides of the
Atlantic feared that they were in danger of becoming public
servants. Long bouts of prices falling below the cost of
production, the phenomenal increase in the wage rate of many kinds
of industrial workers, and the resurgence of popular forms of
republicanism did in fact give the big capitalists cause to worry.
And it was this ominous feeling of potential disaster that lurked
behind their rock-ribbed determination to go on to the gold
standard, disciplining the wage rate of industrial workers, in
turn, and once again make the world a safe place for gentlemen of
property and standing. But the intransigence of business and
government elites in these matters was also fed by a common belief
that their initiatives had shielded the home populations in the
various nation-states of the English speaking world from the worst
features of the Depression of 1906-08, and later First World War,
and that whatever economic spoils accrued to their respective
nation-states as a result were theirs for the taking.
Imperialism and its Discontents
Let us consider the words of two men, T. Thomas Fortune and
Wlliain Lincoln Honnold, who made unique and apparently
contradictory contributions to the practical application of
American corporate liberalism in southern Africa. First T. Thomas
Fortune--Afroamerican newspaper editor and entrepreneur, occasional
ally of Booker T. Washington, and fervrent black nationalist and
anti-imperialist toward the end of his life. At a conference on
missionary activity in southern Africa held at Tuskegee in 18 95 ,
Fortune claimed that:
I believe that the nationalization of Africa will
be along British lines, as that of the United States, in
its language...,in its system of government and in its
religion. The English language is the strongest of all
languages, the most elastic in its structure, the most
comprehensive in its use as avehicle of human thought
and expression. The Engli sh system of civil government is
the best that has been devised because it allows the greatest
possible freedom to the citizen...
Now Honnold--a white American mining engineer who came out to the
Rand at the close of the South African War, founding member of that
incubator of the second generation of Randlords, the Fortnightly
Club, and confidant of Herbert Hoover, who himself was a mining
engineer and who later became President of the United States at the
outset of the Great Depression:
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These remarks are not intended for publication but more
to put you in touch with the situation as it appears to
position out here for the reason that it is quite impossible
for those unfamiliar with local conditions, whether it be
yourself or your readers to see the matter in its true light.
There is too much danger of saying something which will only
be misleading at home but attract either ridicule or
resentment here. I have in mind particularly what you said
with regard to sending over some of our American niggers and
your Methusaleh article.
With regard to American niggers they would be the very
worst thing that could be introduced. Aside from the fact that
we require cheaper labor than they would provide, there is the
much greater objection that they would tend to awake a spirit
of insubordination among the ordinary natives. The nigger at
home is very jealous of his position, and is always looking
for an opportunity to emphasize his idea of his equality with
the whites, and when he comes out here, as I have had occasion
to note, he puts on even more airs than at home, and becomes
a great nuisance, by reason of the distorted American ideas
of liberty and equality, which he is always giving out to the
niggers here.
The only possible way in which the small majority(sic)
of whites can hope to preserve themselves is by keeping the
niggers constantly under control and not allowing them, under
any circumstances, to get the idea thatthey are the equal of
the whites, and therefore you can see that to introduce
leaders among them with all the distorted ideas which the
American nigger would be bound to bring, would be fatal.
Honno.ld wrote this rambling and vitriolic letter to T.A. Rickard,
an American partner in Herbert Hoover's London based engineering
firm, Bewick and Moresby, on 30 June 1903. Rickard was also the
edi Lor of the Engineering and Mining Journal, a magazine that was
to establish the leadership of American engineers in
shaping the mining industry on a global scale during the years
immediately following the First*. World War. Honnold ' s letter to
Rickard was, in fact, the culmination of more than a generation of
an American presence on South Africa's Rand. Indeed American
engineers, merchants and mineworkers had been in South Africa from
the inception of gold mining in the iate 1870s and 1880s--to the
point that contemporaries claimed that the first mining settlements
in and around Johannesburg had a "pronounced American flavour".
After the Boer or South African War of 1899-1902 the American
influence on the Rand and in other nascent industrial regions of
southern Africa grew by leaps and bounds—despite the primacy of
British imperial interests in southern Africa.
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The South African War of 1899-1902 was the third major
military conflict of the industrial age(the American Civil War and
the Franco-Prussian War were the first two). Once the war
commenced, the impact of industrialization rolled northward, up the
Zambezi floodplain, by dint of bayonets, Maxim guns, cannons and
caissons, as well as machine tools and drilling rigs. African
peasants saw their land enclosed and expropriated by force of arms
rather than the law, for armies had to be fed and mines kept in
production. But the war's military tactics and its subvention--
J.P. Morgan lent the British government two hundred million dollars
in order to bring the war to a swift close, for example—dredged
up the most ironic feature of southern Africa's industrial
revolution: that industrialization proceeded on the basis of two
interrelated but competing conceptions of empire--one British, one
American. The most palpable expression of this paradox was a
society and industrial workforce imprisoned by an especially
virulent form of institutional racism, to which Honnold's letter of
1903 bore powerful witness in spite of itself. Moreover, this
paradox further enhanced the discontinous nature of southern
Africa's industrial growth. Rapid economic change, which had been
compelled by war and imperial ambitions, and a relatively high but
fluctuating minimum for white living standards established the
context of the postwar social order. Yet by the outset of the
First World War all the peoples of southern Africa--including the
former citizens of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal
Republic, the two defeated Boer republics—would look back on the
string of British military victories during the South African War
in much the same way that former masters and slaves in the United
States must have perceived the powerfully destructive and
liberating march of General William T. Sherman's army from city of
Atlanta to the Atlantic Ocean: the British victory in the war was
more than a horrifying and stunning set of military campaigns — it
was the end of a way of life.
But this end was neither abrupt nor absolute. The Africans
who had fled the mines and the sprawling industrial city of
Johannesburg at the outset of the war did not immediately offer
themselves up for hire at the war' s conclusion. Nor did the
Africans who lived in the vicinity of the mines. More than a year
after the war less than half of the prewar complement of African
workers had returned. African workers were in fact engaged in what
amounted to a d_e facto general strike. On the other hand,
profits from the gold mines were not reinvested in the industry to
any great degree. Consequently, the financial structure of the
mining industry retained a speculative character; and, despite the
dramatic consolidation of ownership of the gold mines after the
war, deep level mining still did not dominate mining operations.
Vet even with the reduced operations of the immediate postwar
period, the South African Rand was producing well over a third o f
the world's gold supply--at the very moment that gold was becoming
the chief money commodity of world trade. Moreover, gold mining in
South Africa came to be dominated by four major entrepreneurs and
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their respective companies—Barney Barnato and the Kiraberley
Company; Alfred Beit and his associates at Werhner-Beit Company;
Cecil Rhodes and Consolidated Goldfields Company; and Anton
Dunkelsbuhler and the Consolidated Mines Selection Company. In
fact the latter company became the parent company of arguably the
most powerful mining syndicate in the world after 1926 --the
Oppenheimer and Morgan Guaranty Trust creation, the Anglo-American
Mining Corporation.
Changes on the Land
The peasantry reaped the whirlwind in the wake of these
events. After the war the new colonial state!the provisional
military government and later the Reconstruction Government of
Alfred Lord Milner) had to legitimate its infringement upon the
peasantry's "subsistence threshhold"--that portion of the annual
harvest that kept the peasant and his immediate family from
plunging into starvation and total destitution--while
simultaneously transforming that infringement into a regular lien
on peasant production. For a brief, incandescent moment- at the
outset of the war, when the armed intervention of African
irregulars and African cooperation in transporting equipment and
troops had been crucial to salvaging the British offensive, the
African peasantry of the Transvaal and the border regions of Natal
and the Orange Free State appeared on the verge of taking back some
of what they had lost to the Boer republics and British colonial
rul e at the Cape and in Natal . However, a peace that initally
appeared to underwrite a more politically enfranchised and
economically competitive African peasantry frightened the
provisional British military government and the defeated Afrikaner
leadership into complicity less than a year after the close of the
war. By 1904 their anxieties had coalesced into a shrill demand
for a harsher and more punitive version of the 1895 Plakkers Wet or
Squatters' Law of the Transvaal Republic. Also, the marked
increase of the Transvaal's rural African population, particularly
in the Waterberg and Zoutspansberg districts, further e:(acerbated
white anxiety. Consider the summary testimony of W. Windham,
Secretary of the Native Affairs Department(NAD) for the Transvaal
at the 1904 Lagden Commission hearings:
Is it not, in short, Mr. Windham, as a matter of
expediency that you will not let the Native have land
and you will not let him have a vote; is it not really
a matter of expediency, because he will eventually
outnumber the whites?--[ Windham ] That, is a fact,
undoubtedly.-- It is a matter of expediency; you do not think
that he should have a vote, and you do not think that he
should have land, because he would outnumber the white
race0--[.Windham ] I am opposed to it as a matter of expediency
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and as a matter of State policy.—It does seem a little
inconsistent. To use your own expression, you would create
individual responsibility; he pays his rates and his taxes,
and yetyou would not allow him to voice his interest in the
manner which I have clearly stated, that is by means of his
nominated or elected representatives. You mean that he would
have to take anyone that was chosen to be given to him?--
[Windham] Yes, so long as he is in his present savage state.
The expropriation of the war years had rested en direct military
force. That of the postwar years had to rest more on a form of
compulsion created by market forces, the advance of the railroads,
and an uneven dispensation of justice.
Prior to the war, even with the assistance of the governments
of the Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free State, Boer farmers
just barely maintained their edge over money-minded African peasant
farmers. In fact, African tenancy on whi te farms was pervasive-
-so much so that it became the principal obstacle to increasing the
pool of indigenous African wage labor--hence the acute dependence
of the mine and sugar plantation owners on migrant African labor
from Mozambique--and to raising the output on white farms.
According to our friend William Hall, the dense presence of African
tenants in rural Transvaal amounted to an instance of "declining
marginal utility". In other words, as long as Africans had access
to productive land as tenants or smallholders, they would
constitute a major obstacle to the transformation of the legal and
political context of property ownership. On the other hand the
two Afrikaner republics were content to redirect the revenue
derived from the taxation of gold production in the direction of
white farmers in the form of state subsidies. However, most of the
capital invested in agriculture by the state was siphoned off into
activities such as the distillation of cheap grain spirits, which,
in turn, was consumed by African arid white mineworkers. The grisly
fact of the matter was that white farmers could not feed the
burgeoning industrial workforce of the Rand on their own, or with
the explicit assistance of the two republics.
Without African tenants, output on white farms in the Orange
Free State and the; Transvaal Republic would have been even more
abyssmal than its depressing levels of the 1880s and 1890s.
Consequently, the rinderpest or Hoof and Mouth epidemic of 1895-6
was a windfall for white farmers; for with the destruction or
despoilation of herds of African cattle, which were crucial sources
of invested wealth for the peasant farmer, particularly when they
were combined with plows, white farmers were assured of more
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African tenants. But even with the prospect of more tenants,
output levels on white farms moved only slightly on the eve of the
war— in inverse proportion to white anxiety. Observe the ominous
tone of the 1904 testimony of G.G. Munnik, a farmer and former
Landrrost and Mining Commissioner for the Transvaal Republic:
In the last two or three years, first of all there
was the war, when they [Africans] did not cultivate much, the
followed two years of drought; what became of them then? I
will tell you. During the war the the Native earned very high
wages. Not only did he earn high wages, but he looted and
stole everything he could lay his hands on; whether it was
a bedstead, or whether it was a coffee pot, he stole and took
it home...; and that is really why there has been a scarcity
of labour, because he has been looking after all this stolen
stuff...
I may tell you that in Zoutspansberg there is great
dissatisfaction at this moment amongst the white population
because lands which were surveyed for whites are now being
leased to Kafirs. I am alluding to the agricultural lots at
Haenertsberg, upon the gold-fields... These lots which are
called 'agricultural lots' were distinctly surveyed for white
people of limited means to supply the gold-fields with farm
and garden produce.
African peasant farmers had their own designs on the incipient
commercial market of Johannesburg, with its more than one hundred
thousand souls jammed into boardinghouses, brothels and
company compounds. The war, at least initially, did little to
change their expectations.
Conclusion
What gave rise to a more constrained interpretation of tenancy
and the elimination of a large number of African squatters and
smallholders immediately after the South African war? In a
nutshell, it was market opportunities minus large amounts of
investment capital. Before l.he war the terms of the economic
formula had been just the reverse , since neither the prewar
republics nor white landowners were in a hurry to transform African
squatters into formal tenants; for such a trans formation would have
also contained certain explicit contractual obligations for white
landowners as well. After the var there was a dramatic increase in
African tenancy and an equally dramatic, transformation of the way
the land was worked over large portions of South Africa. But until
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the repression of the 1906 Poll Tax or Bambatha Rebellion, and the
consequent advent of the Het Volk Government in 1907, the the
transformation of South Africa's countryside was not inscribed
within a legal framework or an explicit political arrangement
between the state and white landowners. Doubtless the control of
more than a third of the Transvaal ' s land by a single mining
syndicate, the Central Mining Trust, had something to do with this.
To be sure , there was no shortage of violent expropriation.
And in instances where African tenant farmers and small landowners
expressed their collective greivances in a direct manner, as they
did during the Bambatha Rebellion in Natal, the subsequent white
repression assumed the inchoate characteristics of a pogrom. The
African peasantry was indeed plundered, but not through a
combination of selective re interpretations of prewar labor
regulations and statutes backed up by the judicious display of the
state's police power. Rather, the state, for lack of a coherent
policy of its own, rushed in to legitimate the excesses of white
vigilantes. Then and only then were African peasants more
systematically divested of land and rights in land. Subsequent
expropriation was especially bitter because between 1902 and 1907
African peasants in a number of districts aand territories had in
fact gained and consolidated some access to a commercial market and
embellished the agricultural means of production of white
landowners with their cattle and plows, and with the labor of their
families.
Moreover, the sighting and construction of railroads served to
eliminate communities of African smallholders that were responding
to the burgeoning urban market for food. Railroad construction
often compelled relatively prosperous peasants to get their
customary tenure of land recognized by registry offices and
magistrates--a next to impossible task after the Het Volk
government assumed office. Within less than the span one business
cycle large numbers of African peasants went from a status of
tenant farmer or small landowner who possessed plows, cattle, and
some moveable property to squatters and completely dispossessed
agricultural laborers.
There had been a certain degree of manueverability within
tenancy for the peasant farmer. The tenant could always turn his
possession of moveable property such as wagons, plows, and cattle,
and his control over potential labor within his family to his
advantage. It was not for nothing therefore that the Milner and
Het. V"o 1 k Governments pushed for legislation that would have forced
tenants to register immedi ate]y marriages, particularly if they
were of a polygynous nature. Infant mortality among tenant
households was not the object of such meticulous scrutiny, however,
once tenancy became a disguised form of wage labor in the closing
years of the Milner Government. To be sure, some African
communi ties on the highveld of the Transvaal , Natal , and in the
Orange Free State were not so readily humbled; but instead of
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making African tenants and smallholders citizens of a more rational
form of bourgeois state by generalizing the Cape Franchise, the
postwar governments further exposed rural Africans to the greed of
resident and absentee landlords. In so doing, they compelled the
law to contravene the logic of the existing capitalist market.
In 1912 and 1913 the Union Government, which had come to power
in 1910, deprived African peasant farmers of even this helot-like
status by passing the Masters and Servants Act and the Native Land
Act. Together the two laws attached more than eighty seven percent
of African land. Africans who held land on the basis of written
contractual tenure were dispossessed as swiftly as those with
customary claims in many instances. The legal and social basis of
African tenant farming were destroyed in the process, even though
tenancy persisted in the abovementioned areas, particularly in
those districts that contained large numbers of white absentee
landlords.
The permanence of industrial capitalism was pretty much
assured once the Boer republics were defeated, but the bizarre
makeup of the agrarian world caused industry to plagued by a
twofold problem: the rural areas either could not or would not
supply labor according to the specifications of the mining
industry's desires; and the physical and administrative
infrastructure of the industrial towns could not have adequately
accomodated it anyway, for the war had seriously interrupted the
mining industry's efforts at capital acccumulation. The road was
ostensibly paved for the ostensibly cheap labor produced by the
migrant labor system.
Large scale capitalist agriculture meant dispossessing
hundreds of thousands of African peasants and moving a potentially
enormous landless workforce to settler farms as well as mines and
factor!es. There was no guarantee—or even real likelihood—that
a large addition could be amde to the African workforce without
further reducing productivity--at least initially. Maintaining an
urban population would have much more expensive than maintaining a
more self-sufficilent rual one, especially in the absence of a
strong network of internal transportation-- which would have also
been expensive. Most of the governments that came to power in
South Africa, and in southern Africa generally, chose neither
option. Instead they chose aspects of both, whenever it seemed
expedient. The transformation of who worked the land--and under
what circumstances--was in fact the obverse side of southern
Africa's industrialization. The trouble is determining where the
"political" shades into the "economic" and vice versa.
Every instance of industrialization is discontinuous inasmuch
as its particular pattern derives from one of several historical
alternatives. These alternatives are formed on the basis of how
the distribution of power and wealth in a given society elaborates
the manipulation of nature and the availability of teachnological
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applications. Once an alternative is chosen, however, substantial
investments in human effort, information, and equipment constrain
subsequent choices. For not only the rate but also the direction
of industrial growth and agricultural depend on the distribution of
entitlements. Hence the difficulty of uncovering what the other
alternatives were lies in the facility and speed with which the
triumphant one marginalizes the accomplishments of its former
competitors.
This kind of marginalization is ultimately a political
exercise. Its authors depend greatly on the state's ability to
privilege and penalize discrete groups and activities. State
intervention in this process is therefore manifold and
dynamic~-even instances where its objectives are of a conservative
nature. It is by no means limited to the passive function of
limiting or enhancing access to national and international markets.
For example, while magistrates and NAD officers in the Transvaal
and Natal were violently opposed to "lobolo" or cattle dowry, they
were equally insistent that Africans not be in a position to resort
to common law in civil and legal matters.
Nevertheless, the absence of a theory of distribution within
marginal utilitarian economics gives the market an apparently
inordinate amount of influence in ordering civil society. The
absence of theory of distribution within capitalist economic theory
was also why engineers became so readily the new intelligentsia of
the bourgeoisie after the generation of slump and depression.
Hence it was not so much that big entrepreneurs in South Africa and
the United States believed in scientific management per se, but in
lieu of a more proactive method of cost accounting, it seemed the
most reasonable approach on the horizon during the period in
question.
However, as recent historians of South Africa such as Tim
Keegan, Jeremy Krikler, Bill Nasoon, and Charles van Onselen have
demonstrated, there were occasional dissonant and cacophonous
voices that contested the "progressive" nature of this particular
pattern of industrialization and state intervention. Such voices
were often compelled by the legal constraints that
industrialization imposes on the ownership of all forms of private
property. The problem for historians is that there is no way of
accounting for these dissonant voices-or the lost alternatives-by
simply reconstructing the secular trend of industry's achievements.
Corporate organization in South Africa and the rest of the
subcontinent moved rapidly away from its more charitable model and
its democratic trappings as early as the first years of the Milner
Government, even though the full implications of its departure
would not be made clear until the Union Government promulgated the
Masters and Servants Act and the Land Act of 1912 and 1913. The
passage of the latter acts was analogous to the hoisting of the
Jolly Roger; for the latter symbol's universally recognized
18
insignia--the skull and crossbones--captured the essence of the
dispensation that the majority of the population received from the
new social order.
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